## 1NC

### Off

[New AFFs Bad]

Second is dialogic clarity – your education is meaningless if we have nothing to say

Gerald Graff, University of English& Education, University of Illinois at Chicago, Clueless in Academe: How Schooling Obscures The Life of The Mind, ‘3, p. 11-12

But an even more important point that some readers of my work have missed is that the ultimate motivation of my argument for teaching the conflicts is the need to clarify academic culture, not just to resolve spats among academics or cultural factions. My assumption is that an institution as rife with conflicts as the American school and college can clarify itself only by making its ideological differences coherent. But even if our cultural and educational scene were a less contentious place than it is, the centrality of controversy to learning would still need to be stressed. For there exists a deep cognitive connection between controversy and intelligibility. John Stuart Mill pointed up the connection when he observed that we do not understand our own ideas until we know what can be said against them. In Mill's words, those who "have never thrown themselves into the mental position of those who think differently from them ... do not, in any proper sense of the word, know the doctrine which they themselves profess."9 In other words, our very ability to think depends on contrast-on asking "as opposed to what?" This "dialogical" or contrastive character of human cognition has long been a given of modern thought, but the academic curriculum with its self isolated courses has yet to reflect it. When schooling is bad or dull, it is often because the curriculum effaces this element of contrast or as-opposed-to-whatness from students' view. the academic habit of evading conflict helps obscure the life of the mind.

Third is ideological coalitions – you prevent self-reflexive politics

Torvalds and Diamond ‘1

[Linus (Creator of Linux) and David (freelance contributor to the New York Times and Business Week); “Why Open Source Makes Sense”; Educause Review; November/December; p. 71-2 //nick]

It's the best illustration of the limitless benefits to be derived from the open source philosophy. While the PC wasn't developed using the open source model, it is an example of a technology that was opened for any person or company to clone and improve and sell. In its purest form, the open source model allows anyone to participate in a project's development or commercial exploitation. Linux is obviously the most successful example. What started out in my messy Helsinki bedroom has grown to become the largest collaborative project in the history of the world. It began as an ideology shared by software developers who believed that computer source code should be shared freely, with the General Public License - the anticopyright - as the movement's powerful tool. It evolved to become a method for the continuous development of the best technology. And it evolved further to accept widespread market acceptance, as seen in the snowballing adoption of Linux as an operating system for web servers, and in its unexpectedly generous IPOs. What was inspired by ideology has proved itself as technology and is working in the marketplace. Now open source expanding beyond the technical and business domains. At Harvard University Law School, professors Larry Lessig (who is now at Stanford) and Charles Nesson have brought the open source model to law. They started the Open Law Project, which relies on volunteer lawyers and law students posting opinions and research on the project's Web site to help develop arguments and briefs challenging the United States Copyright Extension Act. The theory is that the strongest arguments will be developed when the largest number of legal minds are working on a project, and as a mountain of information is generated through postings and repostings. The site nicely sums up the trade off from the traditional approach: "**What we lose in secrecy, we expect to regain in depth of sources and breadth of argument."** (Put in another context: With a million eyes, all software bugs will vanish.) It's a wrinkle on how academic research has been conducted for years, but one that makes sense on a number of fronts. Think of how this approach could speed up the development of cures for diseases, for example. Or how, with the best minds on the task, international diplomacy could be strengthened. As the world becomes smaller, as the pace of life and business intensifies, and as the technology and information become available, people realise the tight-fisted approach is becoming increasingly outmoded. The theory behind open source is simple. In the case of an operating system - is free. Anyone can improve it, change it, exploit it. But those improvements, changes and exploitations have to be made freely available. Think Zen. The project belongs to no one and everyone. When a project is opened up, there is rapid and continual improvement. With teams of contributors working in parallel, the results can happen far more speedily and successfully than if the work were being conducted behind closed doors. That's what we experienced with Linux. Imagine: Instead of a tiny cloistered development team working in secret, you have a monster on your side. Potentially millions of the brightest minds are contributing to the project, and are supported by a peer-review process that has no, er, peer.

### Off

We’ll begin with a story fromMeinzerin, Kuhn, and Klausmann in 1997

(Marion Meinzerin, professor of history at Cambridge University, Gabriel Kuhn, Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Innsbruck, Ulrike Klausman, freelance journalist, “Woman Pirates and the politics of the Jolly Roger”, Pg 18-22, *azp*)

**Medusa is the Gorgon’s head threatening to emerge from the sea. This terrible monster was once a beautiful woman who was raped in a temple of Athena by the sea god Poseidon.** According to Ovid, **Athena was so enraged that she turned Medusa into an ugly creature, transforming her hair into a thousand snakes**. After that **Medusa was so ugly that any man who caught sight of her would turn to stone**. Very much in keeping with modern»day court procedures in cases of rape, **Athena let the rapist go unpunished**. Why was **Athena** so hostile to women? Actually she **was a very ancient wise goddess, of far older origin than the male Hellenic gods.** But **after the arrival of male gods to the mythology, she was transformed into a being birthed from Zeus’s** head, who had swallowed her mother Metis, the Goddess of Wisdom, who was pregnant with Athena by parthenogenesis. Afterwards, **Athena became the protective goddess of many a hero. One of them was Perseus the Destroyer. He was sent to kill Medusa. Athena gave him a perfectly reﬂective bronze shield, so that he could see Medusa without looking at her**. Thanks to this device, **Perseus was able to behead Medusa, with Athena guiding his hand. He stuck Medusa’s head in a sack and gave it as a gift to Athena, who thereafter carried the snakes on her breastplate so as to strike fear into her enemies**. The symbol of the snake always belonged to Athena, whose mother Metis was called “the wise counsel.” In prehistoric times the snake was a symbol of feminine wisdom, and not just of growth and fertility, as was later assumed. Metis and Medusa represent one and the same power. The name Medusa, a feminine form of medon (ruler), derives from the Sanskrit root medha (wisdom), which is also the root for the Greek metis (good counsel). **The grimace of the grey-skinned snake’s head expresses the fury of those women who still remember**. The Latin word for causing someone to think of something, to remind or to warn, is monere. Etymologically a “monster” is thus the “emblem of the gods in terrifying manifestation.” The monster Medusa reﬂects countless obsessive ideas about sea monsters. In mythological terms, **the Medusa story relates the destruction of female culture**; in psychoanalytic terms it describes the hero’s murder of his mother, and femininity as a psycho-symbolic monstrosity? In the end **Perseus failed to achieve his goal, despite divine** protection and all manner of magical assistance, and although he killed his enemy in her sleep with his hand guided by Athena. **Medusa lives on, the Gorgon’s head has grown back, and its fury has by no means burnt out**. The terror of men before Gorgo, who pulls ships into the depths by their bowsprit in the midst of a tempest, is fully justiﬁed. **Gorgo is the Greek name not only for Medusa—petriﬁed through “ugliness”—but also for the mermaids, who are known to be beautiful and lovely. This may seem like a paradox, but corresponds to the ambivalence with which men view the female**. Aristotle’s hostility to women is far more consistent, and serves to clarify the connection. The relationship between femininity, ﬁsh, mermaids, and sea monsters lies in the attributes “wet” and “cold.” These beings all have a shortage of “heat,” and are thus also lacking in soul and reason. According to Aristotle, a mother only provides the passive material, while the father contributes the active soul endowed with reason. He bears the true species of humans (man). If a mother nonetheless brings a female being to the world, she has circumvented the reasoning species, and once again set loose upon the world a monster lacking in soul. In the legends of seafarers, mermaids also have no souls—but might be able to occasionally acquire one by adopting a respectable way of life among people, and falling in love with a man. Patriarchal **stories of dragon-slaying show two different images of the female: the powerful, threatening mother in the form of the monster, and the desirable, submissive virgin**. In the killing of the dragon, psychoanalysts like C.G. lung and Erich Neumann saw the liberation of **the man from his terrible mother, and the conquest of a new image of the female in the form of the lovely virgin. The man becomes a hero by freeing the virgin from the claws of the mighty monster, in order to subordinate her to himself**. In his book on the origins of consciousness, Erich Neumann writes: “the transformation of the male that occurs in the course of battling the dragon includes a change in his relationship to the female, symbolised in the liberation of the hostage from the power of the dragon; meaning a dissolution of the image of the female from that of the terrible mother.“ Neumann ignores that in antiquity, the life-giving femininity of the Earth and the cosmos was worshipped in the form of the Great Mother. In all her monstrosity she threatens the male need for recognition. That which psychologists understand as the liberation of man from the overwhelming power of mother is actually a desire in the collective male consciousness to subdue nature itself. **The story of** our hero **Perseus goes on to show how pointless these acts of violence actually are. Flying high on the trip home after his “glorious” beheading of Medusa, Perseus encounters a beautiful, naked virgin chained to a cliff. On the horizon a sea monster approaches**. The unhappy girl is the daughter of an Ethiopian queen, who had boasted that she and her daughter were as beautiful as the Nereids. The Nereids promptly lodged a complaint with Poseidon, who sent out a ﬂood of storms and a female sea monster in retribution. An oracle declared that the queen’s daughter had to be chained to the cliffs. **Perseus, a man of action, did not dilly-dally**. After quickly negotiating the dowry with the parents of the princess, **he killed the monster in a bloody battle, and “as prize and cause of all the trouble the virgin strides up, released from her chains**,” according to Ovid. Here **Perseus seems to have won the battle of his life, acquiring a kingdom and a lovely princess.** But closer observation shows that the action has gone subtly awry. **The lovely and passive princess is called Andromeda**: andro-mcda, meaning **the “ruler of men.” The information that her mother is an Ethiopian suggests a likely relationship to the Libyan Medusa**. **Apparently the beautiful virgin and her monstrous mother relate one and the same femininity**. Leviathan poses the biblical counterpart to the Greek myth of Medusa. He is a sea serpent, appearing in the legends of sea travellers as the worst of all sea monsters, crushing ships and swallowing seafarers.

The affirmative’s view of the subject under capital is that of Perseus’s perception of women – the Other is dangerous yet alluring – something to be mapped yet radically unknowable – something to be defeated yet something to be won – a roll of the ballot calling for the liberation of the oppressed is symptomatic of the masculine heroism Perseus is engrained in – the ballot becomes a symbol of the prize of Otherness while ontologically erasing the subaltern – the affirmative’s distancing of themselves from those they invoke is like Perseus’s shield – they view the subaltern through a kaleidoscopic lens while sitting comfortably in this air conditioned simulacra we call the debate round – this knowledge production is not just useless neutrality but rather the lynchpin of the Western intellectual subject – any argument the affirmative makes about how the subaltern would totally be on-board with their project relies on the same logic that reinforces conceptions of the inferior Other – their forcus on voice in the first contention is ironic because a ballot for the affirmative rips out the subaltern’s vocal chords

Spivak 88 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Indian literary theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture,* 1988“Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Online, *azp*)

SOME OF THE most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The much publicized critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject. . . . This S/subject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international division of labor. It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary — not only by ideological and scientiﬁc production, but also by the institution of the law. . . . In the face of the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intel- lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the ﬁnal determinant or the transcendental signiﬁed. The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, fareflung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other. This project is also the asymetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redeﬁnition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular redeﬁnition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged pans ofa vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narra- tive of imperialism be recognized as ‘subjugated knowledge,’ ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualiﬁed as inadequate to their task or insufﬁ- ciently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientiﬁcity‘ (Foucault I980: 82). This is not to describe ‘the way things really were’ or to privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history. It is, rather, to offer an account of how an explanation and narrative of reality was established as the normative one. . . . Let us now move to consider the margins (one can just as well say the silent, silenced center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the urban subproletariat. According to Foucault and Deleuze (in the First World, under the standardization and regimentation of socialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) the oppressed, if given the chance (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here), and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work here) can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront the following question: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak? . . .

Isn’t it off-putting that the affirmative merely expresses solidarity with the oppressed yet does little to nothing to actually relieve their oppression? – What do you think their endless theories, intellectual movements, and speech acts actually DO to resolve anything? – the answer is absolutely nothing – they aren’t subversive, nor radical, nor even that interesting – their speech act is an intellectual façade designed to avoid having to resolve oppression

Raskin 99 (Marcus Raskin, Professor of Public Policy at George Washington University, 1999, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Fall)

As I have noted, world social categories and knowledge systems have changed so that they now see the colonized as human beings. The shifting in social categories, often by those who are the radicals and liberals of the privileged groups, created deep divisions between reality and its description. But this has not necessarily resulted in fundamental affirmative change. For those who were consigned to the role of slave, serf and oppressed by imperial Western nations, it may be disconcerting, but pleasantly surprising, that some leading international lawyers and intellectuals stand with those movements that take their strength from the dispossessed, wretched and exploited, whether in war or peace. Even though these idealists are educated in Western and imperial categories of social reality, they have, nonetheless, taken as their task the reconstruction and transformation of international law as it is understood in the United States. The skeptical are permitted their doubts, however. After all, what can those who represent the pain of others, and only indirectly their own, do to ameliorate the pain of misery sanctioned by imperial law? **What do such a band of idealists dare to teach to those who suffer, especially when that suffering is often caused, directly or indirectly, by the choices made by the very class of which these Western intellectuals and lawyers are members?** Why should the oppressed listen to those educated in a language and thought-pattern which, beneath the honeyed words, are the egocentric and ethnocentric doctrines of the [\*524] dominator? Certainly until decolonization, the abstract meaning of the words were employed as signifiers and killers of the culturally oppressed. The language of description and the mode of argument, the very words themselves, were instruments of the colonizer. Their very rules, laws, precedents and citations acted as a steel-belted noose to stifle the cries of the wretched. And yet, these were the very lessons the colonized needed to learn in order to stand up to the colonizer and survive. Not only did they survive, they pressed on to reform nineteenth and early twentieth century imperial law using the UN, and the International Court of Justice. Most importantly, they effected the consciousness of nations. Nevertheless, the wretched must wonder why, behind claims of universality and universal human rights, our actions and thoughts have an often indeterminate or contradictory effect. For Americans, the reason is a complex one. Americans seek identification with the victim in their dreams, but the reality for the American political and legal class is somewhere between carelessness and negligence of the oppressed worker, toleration for the destruction of other people's cultures for purposes of extraction and commodification, exploiter of their lands, and executioner in counter-revolutions which rain bombs of state and financial terror around the world. So even when some in the United States stand with the victim, they must always wonder, "Who are we that come forward with our notions that speak of human affirmation? Who are we to tell the colonized when independence is a drag on themselves and on others as well, possibly leading to war and internecine conflict?" And the wretched can go further and say, "You have recognized our struggle, taken away our language and substituted your words of understanding, but **now what?** How is freedom to be sustained? We, the formerly marginalized, the indigenous and the merely wretched, have come to recognize that what is presented by the West to humanity as conventional knowledge is a betrayal." In truth, **it was a betrayal by intellectuals and all those who dared to suggest that the twentieth century could be a time of liberation and freedom**. **Education and knowledge as mediated through the colonizer's strainer has left humanity in worse shape than at the beginning of the twentieth century**. For some, the god that really failed them was education/knowledge, which, through its institutions, set itself up as the emancipator. This failure, this sense of futility where knowledge is an instrument of domination for the few, demands recognition.

The affirmative’s narrative structure perpetuates a politics of forced presencing that extends the disciplinary logic of the system to the confessional while depoliticizing their speech act, ensuring that dominant relations go unaltered

Brown 96 (Wendy Brown \* Wendy Brown is Professor of Women's Studies and Legal Studies, and is Co-Director of the Center for Cultural Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable 1996)

But if the silences in discourses of domination are a site for insurrectionary noise, if they are the corridors we must fill with explosive counter-tales, it is also possible to make a fetish of breaking silence. Even more than a fetish, it is possible that this ostensible tool of emancipation carries its own techniques of subjugation--that it converges with non-emancipatory tendencies in contem- porary culture (for example, the ubiquity of confessional discourse and rampant personalization of political life), that it establishes regulatory norms, coincides with the disciplinary power of confession, in short, feeds the powers we meant to starve. While attempting to avoid a simple reversal of feminist valorizations of breaking silence, it is this dimension of silence and its putative opposite with which this Article is concerned. In the course of this work, I want to make the case for silence not simply as an aesthetic but a political value, a means of preserving certain practices and dimensions of existence from regulatory power, from normative violence, as well as from the scorching rays of public exposure. I also want to suggest a link between, on the one hand, a certain contemporary tendency concerning the lives of public figures--the confession or extraction of every detail of private and personal life (sexual, familial, therapeutic, financial) and, on the other, a certain practice in feminist culture: the compulsive putting into public discourse of heretofore hidden or private experiences--from catalogues of sexual pleasures to litanies of sexual abuses, from chronicles of eating disorders to diaries of homebirths, lesbian mothering, and Gloria Steinam's inner revolution. In linking these two phenomena--the privatization of public life via the mechanism of public exposure of private life on the one hand, and the compulsive/compulsory cataloguing of the details rof women's lives on the other--I want to highlight a modality of regulation and depoliticization specific to our age that is not simply confessional but empties private life into the public domain, and thereby also usurps public space with the relatively trivial, rendering the political personal in a fashion that leaves injurious social, political and economic powers unremarked and untouched. In short, while intended as a practice of freedom (premised on the modernist conceit that the truth shall make us free), these productions of truth not only bear the capacity to chain us to our injurious histories as well as the stations of our small lives but also to instigate the further regulation of those lives, all the while depoliticizing their conditions.

The 1AC is a form of vampirism which allows privileged institutions and individuals to enhance their social position at the expense of those without privilege. The AFF is merely a market exchange in the political economy of debate which covers over the contradictions of commodification.

Leong 2012

/Nancy, Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law, “Racial Capitalism,” Harvard Law Review, <http://www.utexas.edu/law/colloquium/papers-public/2012-2013/09-20-12_Leong%20--%20Racial%20Capitalism.pdf/>

The exchange mechanism Lin posits, in conjunction with Podolny’s account of status-seeking behavior by market participants, reveals the way that the value associated with non-whiteness is transferred. As a result of the legal and social preoccupation with diversity arising from affirmative action doctrine, white people and predominantly white institutions may elevate their status within various markets by affiliating themselves with non-white individuals. We might, for instance, conceive of a status market in “non-racism.” Within this specific market, white individuals and predominantly white institutions tend to have relatively low status. When a white individual or a predominantly white institution engages in an exchange with a non-white person within such a market, we see, in Podolny’s terms, a status leak. The non-white party loses some amount of status, and the white party absorbs some of the status that the non-white party has lost. Put more concretely, the white individual or predominantly white institution has increased status within the “non-racism” market by demonstrating the ability to engage in a relationship with a non-white individual. Meanwhile, the non-white person’s status has diminished within that same market through affiliation with a white individual or a predominantly white institution. Although such exchanges are not fully theorized in the scholarly literature, we do see limited recognition this sort of racial status exchange: Randall Kennedy, for instance, has chronicled the status diminution of non-white people, particularly those in “elite, predominantly white settings,” when other non-whites perceive that they have “sold out” to the expectations of white society.123

The ballot is also a form of self-subalternization, where the judges are encouraged to found a vacuous solidarity with the Affirmative Other by valorizing the material deprivation portrayed in the 1AC – However, their rhetorical strategy amounts to nothing more than a sham renunciation authorized by the same structures of power that produce alterity in the first place, turning the case at a higher level of analysis.

Chow – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993

(Rey, *Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies*, p. 10-11)

The Orientalist has a special sibling whom I will, in order to highlight her significance as a kind of representational agency, call the Maoist. Arif Dirlik, who has written extensively on the history of political movements in twentieth-century China, sums up the interpretation of Mao Zedong commonly found in Western Marxist analyses in terms of a "Third Worldist fantasy"—"a fantasy of Mao as a Chinese reincarnation of Marx who fulfilled the Marxist premise that had been betrayed in the West."16 The Maoist was the phoenix which arose from the ashes of the great disillusionment with Western culture in the 1960s and which found hope in the Chinese Communist Revolution.17 In the 1970s, when it became possible for Westerners to visit China as guided and pampered guests of the Beijing establishment, Maoists came back with reports of Chinese society's absolute, positive difference from Western society and of the Cultural Revolution as "the most important and innovative example of Mao's concern with the pursuit of egalitarian, populist, and communitarian ideals in the course of economic modernization" (Harding, p. 939). At that time, even poverty in China was regarded as "spiritually ennobling, since it meant that [the] Chinese were not possessed by the wasteful and acquisitive consumerism of the United States" (Harding, p. 941). Although the excessive admiration of the 1970s has since been replaced by an oftentimes equally excessive denigration of China, the Maoist is very much alive among us, and her significance goes far beyond the China and East Asian fields. Typically, the Maoist is a cultural critic who lives in a capitalist society hut who is fed up with capitalism—a cultural critic, in other words, who wants a social order opposed to the one that is supporting her own undertaking. The Maoist is thus a supreme example of the way desire works: What she wants is always located in the other, resulting in an identification with and valorization of that which she is not/does not have. Since what is valorized is often the other's deprivation—"having" poverty or "having" nothing—the Maoist's strategy becomes in the main a rhetorical renunciation of the material power that enables her rhetoric.

The subaltern is subsequently reduced to a fungible object, a passive object for the consumption of the debate community – the affirmative absorbs the power of alterity only to toss its carcass back into the dust

Chow 93 (Rey, Andrew W. Mellon, Professor of the Humanities at Brown University, Writing Diaspora: Contemporary Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, Indiana University Press, pg. 12-13.)

In the “cultural studies” of the American academy in the 1990s. The Maoist is reproducing with prowess. We see this in the way terms such as “oppression,” “victimization,” and “subalternity” are now being used. Contrary to the Orientalist disdain for the contemporary native cultures in the non-West, the Maoist turns the precisely disdained other into the object of his/her study and, in some cases identification. In a mixture of admiration and moralist, the Maoist sometimes turns all people from non-Western cultures into a generalized “subaltern” that is then used to flog an equally generalized “West.” Because the representation of “the other” as such ignores (1) the class and intellectual hierarchies within these other cultures, which are usually as elaborate as those in the West, and (2) the discursive power relations structuring the Maoist’s mode of inquiry and valorization, it produces a way of talking in which notions of lack, subalternity, victimization and so forth are drawn upon indiscriminately, often with the intention of spotlighting the speaker’s own sense of alterity and political righteousness. A comfortably wealthy white American intellectual I know claimed that he was a “third world intellectual” citing as one of his credentials his marriage to a Western European woman of part-Jewish heritage; a professor of English complained about being “victimized” by the structured time at an Ivy League Institution, meaning that she needed to be on time for classes; a graduate student of upper-class background from one of the world’s poorest countries told his American friends that he was of poor peasant stock in order to authenticate his identity as a radical “third worlder representative; male and female academics across the U.S. frequently say they were “raped” when they report experiences of professional frustration and conflict. Whether sincere or delusional, such cases of self-dramatization all take the route of self-sub-alternization, which has increasingly become the assured means to authority and power. What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand. The oppressed, whose voices we seldom hear, are robbed twice - the first time of their economic chances, the second time of their language, which is no longer distinguishable from those who have had our consciousnesses “raised.”

This knowledge production is merely an attempt to map out the coordinates of alterity for the targeting computers of our death machines

Chow, 6 (Rey Chow, Humanities and Modern Culture & Media Studies at Brown University, 2006 The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work, 40-1)

Often under the modest apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the “scientific” and “objective” production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special “areas” became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic conception of the world as target. In other words, despite the claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disciplining, research, and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war—if, for instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes—is it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts to “know” the other cultures? Can “knowledge” that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare’s accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the omnipotence and omnipresence of the sovereign “self”/”eye”—the “I”—that is the United States, the other will have no choice but remain just that—a target whose existence justifies only one thing, its destruction by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber—such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter—will never receive the attention that is due to them. “Knowledge,” however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing of diverse experiences. This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, area studies has been, since its inception, haunted by “the absence of a definable object”—and by “the problem of the vanishing object.”

### Off

The affirmative’s valorization of “human rights” is not natural – it is explicitly anthropocentric and is the foundation of the dichotomy between “human” and the “environment”

Burdon 12 (Peter Burdon – PhD in Earth Jurisprudence and lecturer at Alelaide Law School, August 10, 2010, “ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE LIMITS OF RIGHTS TALK”, http://rightnow.org.au/topics/environment/environmental-protection-and-the-limits-of-rights-talk/) //MD

The rise of environmental human rights

During the 1970s the language of human rights began to make sense to broad communities of people as an “umbrella concept” for combating multiple forms of injustice. Most recently, there has been an attempt to extend human rights for environmental protection. There are two main arguments. First, that human beings have a right to a healthy environment i.e. a right to clean water. Second, that there are ecological limitations to human rights. While not yet implemented in “hard law” the latter argument refers to the idea that individual freedom is not only determined by a social context – but also by an ecological context.¶ Human rights discourse has assumed hegemonic status and is widely billed as “the only game in town” for environmental protection. Yet, many commentators have voiced serious concerns that a human rights model cannot address the root causes of environmental exploitation. To begin, the approach is overtly anthropocentric. Even the phrase “human rights and the environment” is species specific, focuses on “rights” which is an inherently individualistic concept and sets up an immediate dichotomy between the “human” and the “environment”.¶ Linguistics aside, **the very existence of environmental human rights reinforces the idea that the environment and natural resources exist only for human benefit and have no intrinsic worth.** In the example I cited above concerning groundwater pollution, my discussant’s rebuff could easily be viewed as consistent with the ethical framework of environmental human rights. Indeed, no human rights were being infringed, so what is the problem? Thus, while the language of environmental human rights has been seen as a politically useful tool for environmental groups to sway public opinion, it does not fundamentally challenge the mental ideas that partially explain environmental exploitation.¶ A second major critique of environmental human rights is that it seeks to adopt bourgeois legal concepts and treat them as both universal and foundational for the development of an alternative social form. In reality, this is no alternative at all since it merely re-inscribes dominant conceptions of value in a supposedly new framework. Foundational documents for environmental human rights discourse, such as the UN Universal Declaration of Human Right (1948), have also been used as central documents for market-based individualism. As such, it is doubtful whether they can provide the basis for a thoroughgoing critique of liberal or neoliberal capitalism. Indeed, whether it is politically useful to insist that the capitalist political order live up to its own foundational principles is one thing, but to imagine that this politics can lead to a radical displacement of capitalist growth economics is a serious error.

Enables the worst form of oppression – equivalent to slavery, turns the case

Best 6(Steven, Intl Journal of Inclusive Democracy, http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/vol2/vol2\_no3\_Best\_rethinking\_revolution\_PRINTABLE.htm)

The next great step in moral evolution is to abolish the last acceptable form of slavery that subjugates the vast majority of species on this planet to the violent whim of one. Moral advance today involves sending human supremacy to the same refuse bin that society earlier discarded much male supremacy and white supremacy. Animal liberation requires that people transcend the complacent boundaries of humanism in order to make a qualitative leap in ethical consideration, thereby moving the moral bar from reason and language to sentience and subjectivity. Animal liberation is the culmination of a vast historical learning process whereby human beings gradually realize that arguments justifying hierarchy, inequality, and discrimination of any kind are arbitrary, baseless, and fallacious. Moral progress occurs in the process of demystifying and deconstructing all myths ―from ancient patriarchy and the divine right of kings to Social Darwinism and speciesism― that attempt to legitimate the domination of one group over another. Moral progress advances through the dynamic of replacing hierarchical visions with egalitarian visions and developing a broader and more inclusive ethical community. Having recognized the illogical and unjustifiable rationales used to oppress blacks, women, and other disadvantaged groups, society is beginning to grasp that speciesism is another unsubstantiated form of oppression and discrimination. The gross inconsistency of Leftists who champion democracy and rights while supporting a system that enslaves billions of other sentient and intelligent life forms is on par with the hypocrisy of American colonists protesting British tyranny while enslaving millions of blacks. The commonalities of oppression help us to narrativize the history of human moral consciousness, and to map the emergence of moral progress in our culture. This trajectory can be traced through the gradual universalization of rights. By grasping the similarities of experience and oppression, we gain insight into the nature of power, we discern the expansive boundaries of the moral community, and we acquire a new vision of progress and civilization, one based upon ecological and non-speciesist principles and universal justice.

**Our alternative is to endorse the thought experiment of the voluntary global suicide of humanity – that solves**

**Kochi and Ordan 08** – (Dec. 2008, Tarik Kochi, PhD, Lecturer in Law & International Security, University of Sussex, Noam Ordan, linguist and translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, research focus on human cultural history, “An argument for the global suicide of humanity,” Borderlands, <http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol7no3_2008/kochiordan_argument.pdf>)

For some, guided by the pressure of moral conscience or by a practice of harm minimisation, the appropriate response to historical and contemporary environmental destruction is that of action guided by abstention. For example, one way of reacting to mundane, everyday complicity is the attempt to abstain or opt-out of certain aspects of modern, industrial society: to not eat non-human animals, to invest ethically, to buy organic produce, to not use cars and buses, to live in an environmentally conscious commune. Ranging from small personal decisions to the establishment of parallel economies (think of organic and fair trade products as an attempt to set up a quasi-parallel economy), a typical modern form of action is that of a refusal to be complicit in human practices that are violent and destructive. Again, however, at a practical level, to what extent are such acts of nonparticipation rendered banal by their complicity in other actions? In a grand register of violence and harm the individual who abstains from eating non-human animals but still uses the bus or an airplane or electricity has only opted out of some harm causing practices and remains fully complicit with others. One response, however, which bypasses the problem of complicity and the banality of action is to take the non-participation solution to its most extreme level. In this instance, the only way to truly be non-complicit in the violence of the human heritage would be to opt-out altogether. Here, then, the modern discourse of reflection, responsibility and action runs to its logical conclusion – the global suicide of humanity – as a free-willed and ‘final solution’. While we are not interested in the discussion of the ‘method’ of the global suicide of humanity per se, one method that would be the least violent is that of humans choosing to no longer reproduce. [10] The case at point here is that the global suicide of humanity would be a moral act; it would take humanity out of the equation of life on this earth and remake the calculation for the benefit of everything nonhuman. While suicide in certain forms of religious thinking is normally condemned as something which is selfish and inflicts harm upon loved ones, the global suicide of humanity would be the highest act of altruism. That is, global suicide would involve the taking of responsibility for the destructive actions of the human species. By eradicating ourselves we end the long process of inflicting harm upon other species and offer a human-free world. If there is a form of divine intelligence then surely the human act of global suicide will be seen for what it is: a profound moral gesture aimed at redeeming humanity. Such an act is an offer of sacrifice to pay for past wrongs that would usher in a new future. Through the death of our species we will give the gift of life to others. It should be noted nonetheless that our proposal for the global suicide of humanity is based upon the notion that such a radical action needs to be voluntary and not forced. In this sense, and given the likelihood of such an action not being agreed upon, it operates as a thought experiment which may help humans to radically rethink what it means to participate in modern, moral life within the natural world. In other words, whether or not the act of global suicide takes place might well be irrelevant. What is more important is the form of critical reflection that an individual needs to go through before coming to the conclusion that the global suicide of humanity is an action that would be worthwhile. The point then of a thought experiment that considers the argument for the global suicide of humanity is the attempt to outline an anti-humanist, or non-human-centric ethics. Such an ethics attempts to take into account both sides of the human heritage: the capacity to carry out violence and inflict harm and the capacity to use moral reflection and creative social organisation to minimise violence and harm. Through the idea of global suicide such an ethics reintroduces a central question to the heart of moral reflection: To what extent is the value of the continuation of human life worth the total harm inflicted upon the life of all others? Regardless of whether an individual finds the idea of global suicide abhorrent or ridiculous, this question remains valid and relevant and will not go away, no matter how hard we try to forget, suppress or repress it.

### Off

[ASPEC]

**Third, absent specifying, these debates will always lead to a permutation obviating the research ground for comparative institutional analysis**

**Komesar 94** (Neil Komesar, professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin, “Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy,” p 41-2)

Even the constitutions of totalitarian states have contained high sounding announcements of right. The welfare of the populace depends on the presence of institutions capable of translating high sounding principles into substance. Issues of institutional representation and participation seem especially important for the least advantaged, who almost by definition have had difficulties with representation and participation are important for resolving the simpler version of the difference principle, they would seem even more important in fronting the more complicated standard that Michelman derives from Rawls. They would seem more important yet when society faces the immense task of fulfilling a measure of justice that seeks to integrate this difference principle with the concepts of equal opportunity and liberty. Determining the character of the legislature or agency given the task of this integration seems central here. The real content of Rawlsian justice depends on such determination. Any theory of justice capable of even minimally capturing our basic sensibilities has many loosely defined components. Because such loosely defined elements and complicated standards are inherent in goal choice and articulation, the character of the institutions that will define and apply these goals becomes an essential-perhaps the essential-component in the realization of the just society. The more complex and vaguely defined the conception of the good, the more central becomes the issue of who decides-the issue of institutional choice. The discussion of boomer showed that these questions of institutional choice dominate issues of resource allocation efficiency-a definition of the social good more confined and better defined than broader conceptions of the good such as Rawl’s theory of justice. The lessons about the important and complexity of institutional choice derived from Boomer are even more appropriate with more-complex definitions of the good.

**Comparative institutional analysis is the most fundamental question for academics working for social change. Failure to guarantee this ground guarantees organizational failures and prevents critical questioning of ethical responsibility**

**Heminway, 05** (Joan, professor of law at the University of Tennessee, 10 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 225, lexis)

This article offers a model for comparative institutional choice specifically for use in the context of federal corporate governance reforms. It also, however, constitutes part of the larger academic movement advocating comparative institutional analysis. Comparative institutional analysis is **critically important** to the work of scholars and other proponents of law reform. These rule proponents should not suggest changes in legal rules without also suggesting the vehicle for the suggested reforms. The determination of the appropriate rulemaking body should be accomplished by employing some rigorous form of comparative institutional analysis. In this regard, the framework included in this article is intended to endorse in full the views of Professor Neil Komesar when he says: [\*384] ¶ Unless we do better with the difficult issues of institutional choice, any reforms, changes and proposals will remain **illusory or cosmetic**. We will continue to cycle through the same proposals with the same arguments. Today's policy will always have feet of clay and be replaced by yesterday's rejected panacea, which somehow reappears (without blemishes) as tomorrow's solution. Attempts to fashion proposals and programs cannot stop until we fully understand institutional choice. That understanding will be long in coming and is more likely to occur if judges, lawyers and law reformers seriously struggle with the subject **as they make** their decisions and proposals. It is that struggle that I hope for. I want those who make or seek to change law to seriously confront and address institutional choice and comparison. I recognize that, to do so, they will often have to rely on intuition and guesses. It is the **responsibility** of legal academics to provide deeper understanding of these central issues and, therefore, to improve the ability of those who struggle with these decisions. [581](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=aa91df1416a18d87537d72b0e3763e33&docnum=20&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=01ed68c7086eb1b7d8508b691f80e0b7&focBudTerms=imperfect%20alternatives%20and%20komesar%20and%20legislative%20or%20legislature%20or%20executive%20w/20%20judicial%20or%20judiciary%20and%20comparative%20institutional%20analysis&focBudSel=all#n581)

### Off

The logic of preemption is the organizing principle of the global war on terror

De Goede 8

Security Dialogue April 2008 vol. 39 no. 2-3 155-176 icle: Beyond Risk: Premediation and the Post-9/11 Security Imagination Author: De Goede, M. Journal: Security dialogue ISSN: 0967-0106 Date: 04/2008 Volume: 39 Issue: 2-3 Page: 155 DOI: 10.1177/0967010608088773 Marieke de Goede is Professor of Politics, with a focus on 'Europe in a Global Order,' at the Department of Politics of the University of Amsterdam Previously, she worked as Senior Lecturer at the Department of European Studies of the University of Amsterdam. She received her doctorate in International Politics from the University of Newcastle in 2001. She previously held the Vera List Fellowship at the Graduate Faculty of the New School University in New York (1997-1998) and a post-doctoral Fellowship of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) (2001-2003).

Through its self-conscious deployment of imagination, premediation can be understood to address itself to risk beyond risk (Ewald, 2002: 249). The imagined catastrophe driving premediation is seen to be simultaneously incalculable and demanding new methodologies of calculation and imagination. In this sense, it is akin to a politics of precaution, which, according to Claudia Aradau & Rens van Munster (2007, 2008) is the dispositif through which the ‘war on terror’ has to be understood. ‘Precautionary risk’, write Aradau & van Munster (2007: 101) ‘introduces within the computation of the future its very limit, the infinity of uncertainty and potential damage.’ It is in this very computation of the future at the limit, of course, that financial practices are historically experienced. Indeed, Melinda Cooper (2006: 119) draws out this affinity with speculation when she writes of the logic of precaution: ‘If the catastrophe befalls us, it is from a future without chronological continuity with the past. Though we might suspect something is wrong with the world . . . no mass of information will help us pin-point the precise when, where and how of the coming havoc. We can only speculate’ (emphasis added).

### Case

The aff reveals the perspective of the oppressed, and in so doing shares their secrets—this undermines the potential for resistance, turning the case

**Hundleby 5** (Catherine, U of Windsor, The Epistemological Evaluation of Oppositional Secrets, Hypatia, 20(4), Fall 2005, p. 44-58)//LA

I keep secrets. Even though I am told over and over by white feminists that we must reveal ourselves, open ourselves, I keep secrets. Disclosing our secrets threatens our survival. —María Lugones Postcolonial and other oppositional literature introduces many readers to secrets from the social margins, sometimes only mentioning them, sometimes sharing their content. Moving beyond colonialism and other forms of oppression is as much a goal as a description of this writing. Because survival may be threatened, the question arises in what circumstances feminists should expect the secrets of oppressed people to be shared, and so in what circumstances we should investigate or reveal them. This issue seems to confound the central claim of standpoint epistemologists—postcolonial, feminist, or otherwise—that there is cognitive value in learning from people’s experiences of oppression (Harding 1991; Hartsock 1986; Mills 1998). Whether or not one shares similar experiences, standpoint theorists argue, to begin thought from the perspective of “others” and “other ‘others,’” as Sandra Harding puts it, provides an epistemic advantage. Secrets concerned with resistance, such as in the Underground Railroad, women’s shelters, and lesbian passing, must be especially valuable and relevant to developing knowledge from a standpoint, because activism is supposed to be necessary to acquire the advantage. Yet, revealing aspects of resistance so vulnerable that they are kept secret threatens to undermine the potential of those secrets for resisting and opposing oppression. Thus, the epistemological value of oppositional secrecy seems to conflict with standpoint theorists’ advice of emancipatory activism. The case of oppositional secrecy seems to indicate an exception to standpoint theory, a case in which emancipatory politics does not encourage but prohibits sharing understanding. However, as I argue in this essay, the need to preserve oppositional secrecy is not an exception to, but only a limited case of, standpoint epistemology. Political considerations do not bar some of the understandings that might be gained, but political distinctions do indicate when and where the cognitive value of such understandings tapers off. The cognitive signifi- cance of exposing hidden understanding reduces in cases of extreme political vulnerability that morally require secrecy.

## 2NC

### 2NC Impact – OV

Anthropocentrism outweighs

Gottlieb 94 — Roger S. Gottlieb, Professor of Humanities at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Brandeis University, 1994 (“Ethics and Trauma: Levinas, Feminism, and Deep Ecology,” *Crosscurrents: A Journal of Religion and Intellectual Life*, Summer, Available Online at http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm, Accessed 07-26-2011)

Here I will at least begin in agreement with Levinas. As he rejects an ethics proceeding on the basis of self-interest, so I believe the anthropocentric perspectives of conservation or liberal environmentalism cannot take us far enough. Our relations with nonhuman nature are poisoned and not just because we have set up feedback loops that already lead to mass starvations, skyrocketing environmental disease rates, and devastation of natural resources. The problem with ecocide is not just that it hurts human beings. Our uncaring violence also violates the very ground of our being, our natural body, our home. Such violence is done not simply to the other – as if the rainforest, the river, the atmosphere, the species made extinct are totally different from ourselves. Rather, we have crucified ourselves-in-relation-to-the-other, fracturing a mode of being in which self and other can no more be conceived as fully in isolation from each other than can a mother and a nursing child. We are that child, and nonhuman nature is that mother. If this image seems too maudlin, let us remember that other lactating women can feed an infant, but we have only one earth mother. What moral stance will be shaped by our personal sense that we are poisoning ourselves, our environment, and so many kindred spirits of the air, water, and forests? To begin, we may see this tragic situation as setting the limits to Levinas's perspective. The other which is nonhuman nature is not simply known by a "trace," nor is it something of which all knowledge is necessarily instrumental. This other is inside us as well as outside us. We prove it with every breath we take, every bit of food we eat, every glass of water we drink. We do not have to find shadowy traces on or in the faces of trees or lakes, topsoil or air: we are made from them. Levinas denies this sense of connection with nature. Our "natural" side represents for him a threat of simple consumption or use of the other, a spontaneous response which must be obliterated by the power of ethics in general (and, for him in particular, Jewish religious law(23) ). A "natural" response lacks discipline; without the capacity to heed the call of the other, unable to sublate the self's egoism. Worship of nature would ultimately result in an "everything-is-permitted" mentality, a close relative of Nazism itself. For Levinas, to think of people as "natural" beings is to assimilate them to a totality, a category or species which makes no room for the kind of individuality required by ethics.(24) He refers to the "elemental" or the "there is" as unmanaged, unaltered, "natural" conditions or forces that are essentially alien to the categories and conditions of moral life.(25) One can only lament that Levinas has read nature -- as to some extent (despite his intentions) he has read selfhood -- through the lens of masculine culture. It is precisely our sense of belonging to nature as system, as interaction, as interdependence, which can provide the basis for an ethics appropriate to the trauma of ecocide. As cultural feminism sought to expand our sense of personal identity to a sense of inter-identification with the human other, so this ecological ethics would expand our personal and species sense of identity into an inter-identification with the natural world. Such a realization can lead us to an ethics appropriate to our time, a dimension of which has come to be known as "deep ecology."(26) For this ethics, we do not begin from the uniqueness of our human selfhood, existing against a taken-for-granted background of earth and sky. Nor is our body somehow irrelevant to ethical relations, with knowledge of it reduced always to tactics of domination. Our knowledge does not assimilate the other to the same, but reveals and furthers the continuing dance of interdependence. And our ethical motivation is neither rationalist system nor individualistic self-interest, but a sense of connection to all of life. The deep ecology sense of self-realization goes beyond the modern Western sense of "self" as an isolated ego striving for hedonistic gratification. . . . . Self, in this sense, is experienced as integrated with the whole of nature.(27) Having gained distance and sophistication of perception [from the development of science and political freedoms] we can turn and recognize who we have been all along. . . . we are our world knowing itself. We can relinquish our separateness. We can come home again -- and participate in our world in a richer, more responsible and poignantly beautiful way.(28) Ecological ways of knowing nature are necessarily participatory. [This] knowledge is ecological and plural, reflecting both the diversity of natural ecosystems and the diversity in cultures that nature-based living gives rise to. The recovery of the feminine principle is based on inclusiveness. It is a recovery in nature, woman and man of creative forms of being and perceiving. In nature it implies seeing nature as a live organism. In woman it implies seeing women as productive and active. Finally, in men the recovery of the feminine principle implies a relocation of action and activity to create life-enhancing, not life-reducing and life-threatening societies.(29) In this context, the knowing ego is not set against a world it seeks to control, but one of which it is a part. To continue the feminist perspective, the mother knows or seeks to know the child's needs. Does it make sense to think of her answering the call of the child in abstraction from such knowledge? Is such knowledge necessarily domination? Or is it essential to a project of care, respect and love, precisely because the knower has an intimate, emotional connection with the known?(30) Our ecological vision locates us in such close relation with our natural home that knowledge of it is knowledge of ourselves. And this is not, contrary to Levinas's fear, reducing the other to the same, but a celebration of a larger, more inclusive, and still complex and articulated self.(31) The noble and terrible burden of Levinas's individuated responsibility for sheer existence gives way to a different dream, a different prayer: Being rock, being gas, being mist, being Mind, Being the mesons traveling among the galaxies with the speed of light, You have come here, my beloved one. . . . You have manifested yourself as trees, as grass, as butterflies, as single-celled beings, and as chrysanthemums; but the eyes with which you looked at me this morning tell me you have never died.(32) In this prayer, we are, quite simply, all in it together. And, although this new ecological Holocaust -- this creation of planet Auschwitz – is under way, it is not yet final. We have time to step back from the brink, to repair our world. But only if we see that world not as another across an irreducible gap of loneliness and unchosen obligation, but as a part of ourselves as we are part of it, to be redeemed not out of duty, but out of love; neither for ourselves nor for the other, but for us all.

### 2NC Link – Human Rights – Turns Case

Dichotomizing humans and nature turns the case – anthropocentrism ensures the dominant conception of “human rights” will only recreate violence

Lucas-Rose 06 (Rebecca Garcia Lucas-Rose – Trinity College, University of Melbourne, 2006, “Human Rights: ¶ An Earth-based Ethics”, http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/colloquy/download/colloquy\_issue\_12\_november\_2006/rose.pdf) //MD

At present, the extremity of environmental destruction is grossly and ¶ dangerously demonstrating the human attitude of superiority towards the ¶ other, and underlies the modern human-human relationship forged by epistemic hyperseparation. **An inclusion of humans into the prior construction of** ¶ **‘radical nonhuman other’ has escalated in the modern world**. These humans are identified and otherized as variously continuous with nonhuman ¶ nature and thereat discontinuous with the human. Human difference is ¶ constructed as radical difference. Human others have typically included ¶ people with ‘other’ skin colour or ‘other’ religions, cultures or languages, ¶ women, the poor, or minorities. In the interest of human rights then, our reconsideration of dominant modern epistemology, and its inherent epistemology of hyperseparation, should be unreserved. This reconsideration, ¶ then, involves challenging human/nonhuman, mind/nature, mind/body dualisms. ¶ **The ethical implications of centralizing the human-human relationship** ¶ **through an epistemology of hyperseparation are immense. Nonhumans are** ¶ **excluded from ethical concern on the premise that, as a human-human** ¶ **field, ethics is disengaged from the radically other.**19 Developing from an ¶ epistemic rejection of human-nonhuman interrelationship, and subsequently upon the radical exclusion of those classed as ‘other’, ethics is a ¶ flawed agency for human rights.¶ 20 As philosopher and sociologist Mick ¶ Smith puts it, “the ethical cannot be located entirely in the systemic interchanges between individual humans. Ethics also has to include our relations to nature; it is a lived multidimensional relation of care for natural (and ¶ human) others, a relation that originates in part from the environment itself.”21

### Link

To discuss oppression as “dehumanizing” only reasserts dominate forms of hierarchy in hidden ways and furthers anthropocentric thought.

**Adams 94** (Carol, feminist scholar and animal rights theorist. M.Div. from Yale Divinity School, B.A. from Rochester University. Neither Beast nor Man, P. 77 http://books.google.com/books?id=CinU6Vy\_sYMC)

It is conventionally said that oppression dehumanizes, that it reduces humans to animal status. But oppression cannot dehumanize animals. Animals exist categorically as that which is not human; they are not acknowledged as having human qualities that can be denied. The presumption of an ontological absence of such human qualities has a priori defined animals as nonhuman. Resistance against oppression for humans involves recognizing and preserving their “humanity.” But, it is a humanity established through a form of negating: just as white Americans knew they were free by the presence of enslaved blacks, so oppressed humans affirm their humanity by proclaiming their distance from the animals whom they are compared to, treated like, but never truly are. A litany of protests erupt from those struggling against oppression, proclamations that assert “we are not beasts, we are humans, not animals!” Given the anthropocentric nature of Western culture’s primary conceptualizations, this response is not surprising. As I indicated in the preface, this has been an assertion upon which feminists early staked their appeal for our rights and freedom. Racist and sexist attitudes expose an elastic, mobile species definition that always advantages elite white males by positioning others as almost beasts. Will antiracist and anti-sexist theory so conclusively accept the inescapable anthropocentricity of the human/animal divide that the result will be a fixed species definition that clearly demarcates once and for all, all humans as human beings, thus tacitly but firmly positioning all other animals as “animals”? Consider the synonyms for beast offered by The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Third Edition): “brute, animal, brutish, brutal, beastly, beastial. These adjectives apply to what is more characteristic of lower animals than of human beings.” Will oppositional movements insure that these adjectives always apply only to animals, and thus inscribe as well the hierarchy that positions animals as lower?

**Obsession with language and human communication replicates anthropocentric norms**

**Bell and Russel 2k** (Anne C. Bell, department of education, York University, Canada, and Constance L. Russel, Associate Professor, Faculty of Education, Lakehead University, Co-Editor, Canadian Journal of Environmental Education, “Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn,” CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 25, 3 (2000):188–203, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf)

Although we acknowledge the important contribution of poststructuralism to analyses of oppression, privilege, and power in education, we believe that educators must continue to probe its limitations and implications. Accordingly, we consider here how poststructuralism, as it is taken up within critical pedagogy, tends to reinforce rather than subvert deepseated humanist assumptions about humans and nature by taking for granted the “borders” (as in Giroux, 1991) that define nature as the devalued Other. We ask what meanings and voices have been pre-empted by the virtually exclusive focus on humans and human language in a humancentred epistemological framework. At the same time, we discuss how relationships between language, communication, and meaningful experience are being conceptualized outside the field of critical pedagogy (in some cases from a poststructuralist perspective) to call into question these very assumptions. Although we concentrate primarily on societal narratives that shape understandings of human and nature, we also touch on two related issues of language: the “forgetting” of nonverbal, somatic experience and the misplaced presumption of human superiority based on linguistic capabilities. In so doing, our intention is to deal constructively with some of the anthropocentric blind spots within critical pedagogy generally and within poststructuralist approaches to critical pedagogy in particular. We hope to illuminate places where these streams of thought and practice move in directions compatible with our own aspirations as educators.

Bell and Russell 2k(Anne and Constance, Canadian journal of education, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf)

Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences¶ between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the¶ importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be¶ shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He¶ defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hierarchical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he¶ reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the¶ objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to **infuse the**¶ **world with their creative presence**, to overcome situations that limit them,¶ and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90). Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other animals in terms of their **lack** of¶ such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives¶ “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but¶ to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they **create**¶ **and transform and from which they can separate themselves**,

for animals¶ there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically¶ bound.”¶ To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals¶ only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and¶ though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we¶ as humans are somehow **more unique.** We have the edge over other creatures because we are able to rise above **monotonous**, species-determined¶ biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be¶ **our primary agenda.** Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very¶ essence is to **transform the world** – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation,¶ wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale.¶ This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy.¶ The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is **taken for granted**, its¶ cultural and historical specificity **not acknowledged. And therein lies the**¶ **problem.** Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness¶ from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and¶ communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al.,¶ 1991, p. 91). This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and like¶ other discourses of normalcy, it limits possibilities of taking up and confronting inequities (see Britzman, 1995). The primacy of the human enterprise is simply **not questioned.**¶Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the environmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature¶ of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be¶ passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the¶ relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any¶ sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and¶ other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are **relegated** to¶ environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn,¶ remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell,¶ & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged. ROOTS OF A CRITIQUE¶ Bowers (1993a, 1993b) has identified a number of root metaphors or “analogs” in critical pedagogy that reinforce the problem of anthropocentric¶ thinking. These include the notion of change as inherently progressive, faith in the power of rational thought, and an understanding of individuals¶ as “potentially free, voluntaristic entities who will take responsibility for¶ creating themselves when freed from societal forms of oppression” (1993a,¶ pp. 25–26). Such assumptions, argues Bowers, are part of the Enlightenment legacy on which critical pedagogy, and indeed liberal education¶ generally, is based. In other words, they are culturally specific and stem¶ from a period in Western history when the modern industrial world view¶ was beginning to take shape.¶ To be fair, Bowers understates the extent to which these assumptions are¶ being questioned within critical pedagogy (e.g., Giroux, 1995; Peters, 1995;¶ Shapiro, 1994; Weiler & Mitchell, 1992, pp. 1, 5). Nevertheless, his main¶ point is well taken: proponents of critical pedagogy have yet to confront¶ the ecological consequences of an educational process that reinforces beliefs¶ and practices formed when unlimited economic expansion and social¶ progress seemed promised (Bowers, 1993b, p. 3). What happens when the¶ expansion of human possibilities is equated with the possibilities of consumption? How is educating for freedom predicated on the exploitation of¶ the nonhuman? Such queries push against taken-for-granted understandings of human, nature, **self**, and community, and thus bring into focus the¶ underlying tension between “freedom” as it is constituted within critical¶ pedagogy and the limits that emerge through consideration of humans’¶ interdependence with the more-than-human world.¶ This tension is symptomatic of anthropocentrism. Humans are assumed¶ to be **free agents** separate from and pitted against the rest of nature, our¶ fulfillment predicated on overcoming material constraints. This assumption¶ of human difference and superiority, central to Western thought since¶ Aristotle (Abram, 1996, p. 77), has long been used to justify the exploitation¶ of nature by and for humankind (Evernden, 1992, p. 96). **It has also been**¶ **used to justify the exploitation of human groups (e.g., women, Blacks,**¶ **queers, indigenous peoples) deemed to be closer to nature – that is,**¶ **animalistic, irrational, savage, or uncivilized** (Gaard, 1997; Haraway, 1989,¶ p. 30; Selby, 1995, pp. 17–20; Spiegel, 1988).¶ This “organic apartheid” (Evernden, 1992, p. 119) is bolstered by the¶ belief that language is an exclusively human property that elevates mere¶ biological existence to meaningful, social existence. Understood in this¶ way, language undermines our embodied sense of interdependence with¶ a more-than-human world. Rather than being a point of entry into the webs¶ of communication all around us, language becomes a medium through¶ which we set ourselves **apart and above.**¶This view of language is deeply embedded in the conceptual framework¶ of critical pedagogy, including poststructuralist approaches. So too is the¶ human/nature dichotomy upon which it rests. When writers assume that “it is language that enables us to think, speak and give meaning to the¶ world around us,” that “meaning and consciousness do not exist outside¶ language” (Weedon, 1987, p. 32) and that “subjectivity is constructed by¶ and in language” (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378), then their transformative¶ projects are encoded so as to exclude any consideration of the nonhuman.¶ Such assumptions effectively remove all subjects from nature. As Evernden¶ (1992) puts it, “if subjectivity, willing, valuation, and meaning are securely¶ lodged in the domain of humanity, the possibility of encountering anything¶ more than material objects in nature is **nil**” (p. 108).¶ What is forgotten? What is erased when the real is equated with a¶ proliferating culture of commodified signs (see Luke & Luke, 1995, on¶ Baudrillard)? To begin, we forget that we humans are surrounded by an¶ astonishing diversity of life forms. We no longer perceive or give expression to a world in which everything has intelligence, personality, and¶ voice. Polyphonous echoes are reduced to homophony, a term Kane (1994)¶ uses to denote “the reduced sound of human language when it is used¶ under the assumption that speech is something belonging only to human¶ beings” (p. 192). We forget too what Abram (1996) describes as the gestural,¶ somatic dimension of language, its sensory and physical resonance that we¶ share with all expressive bodies (p. 80).

### AT: Perm

**Total rejection is key**  
**Kochi and Ordan 08** – (Dec. 2008, Tarik Kochi, PhD, Lecturer in Law & International Security, University of Sussex, Noam Ordan, linguist and translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, research focus on human cultural history, “An argument for the global suicide of humanity,” Borderlands, http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol7no3\_2008/kochiordan\_argument.pdf)  
  
Both liberal and social revolutionary models thus seem to run into the same problems that surround the notion of progress; each play out a modern discourse of sacrifice in which some forms of life and modes of living are set aside in favour of the promise of a future good. Caught between social hopes and political myths, the challenge of responding to environmental destruction confronts, starkly, the core of a discourse of modernity characterised by reflection, responsibility and action. Given the increasing pressures upon the human habitat, this modern discourse will either deliver or it will fail. There is little room for an existence in between: either the Enlightenment fulfils its potentiality or it shows its hand as the bearer of impossibility. If the possibilities of the Enlightenment are to be fulfilled then this can *only* happen if the old idea of the progress of the human species, exemplified by Hawking’s cosmic colonisation, is fundamentally rethought and replaced by a new form of self-comprehension. This self-comprehension would need to negate and limit the old modern humanism by a radical anti-humanism. The aim, however, would be to not just accept one side or the other, but to re-think the basis of moral action along the lines of a dialectical, utopian anti-humanism. Importantly, though, getting past inadequate conceptions of action, historical time and the futural promise of progress may be dependent upon radically re-comprehending the relationship between humanity and nature in such a way that the human is no longer viewed as the sole core of the subject, or the being of highest value. The human would thus need to no longer be thought of as a master that stands over the non-human. Rather, the human and the non-human need to be grasped together, with the former bearing dignity only so long as it understands itself as a part of the latter.

### AT: Humans are Valuable

**The human capacity for self-awareness and planning makes human violence more destructive and horrific. Animals don’t commit the holocaust or build slaughterhouses. Our history is a history of genocide and mass death starting with the murder of the Neanderthals.**  
Kochi and Ordan 08 – (Dec. 2008, Tarik Kochi, PhD, Lecturer in Law & International Security, University of Sussex, Noam Ordan, linguist and translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, research focus on human cultural history, “An argument for the global suicide of humanity,” Borderlands, <http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol7no3_2008/kochiordan_argument.pdf>)

Certainly many organisms use ‘force’ to survive and thrive at the expense of their others. Humans are not special in this regard. However humans, due a particular form of self-awareness and ability to plan for the future, have the capacity to carry out highly organized forms of violence and destruction (i.e. the Holocaust; the massacre¶ and enslavement of indigenous peoples by Europeans) and the capacity to develop forms of social organisation and communal life in which harm and violence are organised and regulated. It is perhaps this capacity for reflection upon the merits of harm and violence (the moral reflection upon the good and bad of violence) which gives¶ humans a ‘special’ place within the food chain. Nonetheless, with these capacities come responsibility and our proposal of global suicide is directed at bringing into full view the issue of human moral responsibility. When taking a wider view of history, one which focuses on the relationship of humans towards other species, it becomes clear that the human heritage – and the propagation of itself as a thing of value – has occurred on the back of seemingly endless acts of violence, destruction, killing and genocide. While this cannot be verified, perhaps ‘human’ history and progress begins with the genocide of the Neanderthals and never loses a step thereafter. It only takes a short glimpse at the list of all the sufferings caused by humanity for one to begin to question whether this species deserves to continue into the future. The list of human-made disasters is ever-growing after all: suffering caused to animals in the name of science or human health, not to mention the cosmetic, food and textile industries; damage to theenvironment by polluting the earth and its stratosphere; deforesting and overuse of natural resources; and of course, inflicting suffering on fellow human beings all over the globe, from killing to economic exploitation to abusing minorities, individually and collectively.

## 1NR

The logic of pre-emption leads to both geoengineering as the mass sacrifice of vulnerable populations to secure liberal zones of peace

Anderson 10

Progress in Human Geography 34(6) 777–798 ª The Author(s) 2010 Reprints and permission: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav 10.1177/0309132510362600 phg.sagepub.com Corresponding author: Department of Geography, Durham University, Science Laboratories, South Road, Durham DH1 3LE, UK Email: [ben.anderson@durham.ac.uk](mailto:ben.anderson@durham.ac.uk)

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The most high-profile examples of preemptive action have been in the context of the so called ‘war on terror’ (although see the rise of geo-engineering as a solution to climate change that aims to create life, albeit after the emergence of a threat; Fleming, 2006; Cooper, 2007). The US 2002 National Security Strategy explicitly and infamously articulated a shift from a posture of mutual deterrence to ‘anticipatory action’ against ‘[e]merging threats before they are fully formed’ (US Government, 2002: 4). Preemptive war has damaged and destroyed life in spaces of occupation, ruination and torture (Gregory, 2004; Hannah, 2006), and everyday circulations and transactions have been preemptively secured (Amoore and de Goede, 2008; Adey, 2009). What characterizes such preemptive action is that it is generative. In relation to a present that is unbalanced by potential threats, preemptive logics work by unleashing transformative events in order to avoid a rupture in a valued life. The power of creativity is harnessed. In comparison with the emphasis on continuity that we find in precaution, preemption unashamedly makes and reshapes life (Martin, 2007). In the context of the Iraqi war, for example, this has involved a redistribution of the potential for catastrophe from ‘zones of liberal peace’ to lives that are subject to advanced techniques of damage and destruction (Gregory, 2006; 2008). But other supposedly unintended effects of preemptive action have been extensively documented, not least the proliferation of new security threats. It would be easy to see these effects as separate fromthe logic of preemption and describe them as mistakes. However, such consequences are neither failures nor successes, because in a preemptive logic inaction is not an option so unintended effects are unavoidable. Indeed, as a mode of intervention preemption is indifferent to those generative effects. Why? Because the proliferating effects of preemption may generate something else: opportunities to be seized (Martin, 2007).We see this in the case of the geoeconomics of the 2003 Iraq war. In inciting its adversary to take form, preemptive war in Iraq opened up lucrative markets for private security firms and contractors as well as short-term investment opportunities for finance capital (Martin, 2007). Unlike precaution, which aims to preserve a valued life through prevention, preemptive logics work by proliferating effects and creating life, albeit in the case of the ‘war on terror’ lives that have been abandoned and dispossessed.